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Attempts to augment the function of the
human brain inevitably involve in some
way what Block (1995) calls phenome-
nal consciousness—bodily sensations and
perceptual experiences—the redness of
a strawberry, the smell of newly-baked
bread. At present there is no consensus
among scientists about what such sensory
experiences are. This Opinion piece points
out some problems with one of the major
theatrical viewpoints on that question.
CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
The oldest classification system has two
major categories, dualist and monist.
Dualist theories equate consciousness with
abstracta. Monist (aka physicalist) theo-
ries equate it with concreta. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy approaches
the task of defining abstracta and conc-
reta by the ancient method of providing
examples and letting the reader work it out
for themselves: it says “Some clear cases
of abstracta are classes, propositions, con-
cepts, the letter ‘A’, and Dante’s Inferno.
Some clear cases of concreta are stars,
protons, electromagnetic fields, the chalk
tokens of the letter ‘A’ written on a cer-
tain blackboard, and James Joyce’s copy of
Dante’s Inferno.”
A more recent classification (Atkinson
et al., 2000) divides theories of conscious-
ness into process theories and vehicle the-
ories: it says “Process theories assume
that consciousness depends on certain
functional or relational properties of rep-
resentational vehicles, namely, the com-
putations in which those vehicles engage.
On this view, representational contents are
conscious when their vehicles have some
privileged computational status, indepen-
dently of any particular intrinsic property
of those vehicles.What counts is ‘what rep-
resentational vehicles do, rather than what
they are’. . . For vehicle theories, on the
other hand, consciousness is determined
by intrinsic properties of representational
vehicles, independently of any computa-
tions in which those vehicles engage.”
The relative number of words devoted
to process and vehicle theories in this
description hints that at present, process
theories massively dominate the theoret-
ical landscape. But how sensible are they
really?
THEORIES THAT EQUATE
CONSCIOUSNESS WITH
INFORMATION OR INFORMATION
PROCESSING ARE DUALIST
Most process theories identify conscious-
ness with the processing of information.
As Velmans (1991) puts it: “For radi-
cal behaviorists, all talk of mind could
be translated, without scientific loss, into
talk about behavior. For the new ‘radi-
cal cognitivists’ all talk of mind (including
consciousness) can be translated, without
scientific loss, into talk about information
processing.” In the quarter century since
1991, process theories have become so
deeply embedded that the term “radical”
no longer applies. Pretty well all cognitive
scientists, computationalists and psychol-
ogists now think of consciousness in terms
of information processing. Indeed, among
these groups the information processing
paradigm is so prevalent that it is usually
not seen as necessary to state it explicitly.
Perhaps as a consequence, it is not
widely recognized that the concepts
“process,” “information,” and “infor-
mation processing” are all abstracta.
Thus, mapping the new process/vehicle
dichotomy onto the old dualist/physicalist
axis reveals that process theories (in the
sense of theories that equate consciousness
with information or information process-
ing per se, rather than with any particular
physical realization or implementation
thereof) are dualist. Philosopher David
Chalmers is one of the few process the-
orists to recognize that his theory is an
example of what he calls “naturalistic
dualism” (Chalmers, 1996). The word
“naturalistic” may have been included in
this description in an attempt to make
the “dualism” part more acceptable to
cognitive scientists, most of whom prefer
to see themselves as staunchly scientific
physicalists.
CHALMERS’ PROCESS THEORY
Chalmers (1996) takes information theory
(Shannon, 1948) as his starting point, but
immediately generalizes Shannon’s two-
state “bit” of information to the con-
cept of a multi-state “information space,”
defined as an abstract space consisting
of a number of information states and a
structure of “difference relations” between
them. Chalmers then discusses ways in
which information states can be real-
ized physically, mentioning thermostats,
books, telephone lines, and Bateson’s
catchy slogan about information’s being
“a difference that makes a difference,”
before proposing as a fundamental prin-
ciple that “information (in the actual
world) has two aspects, a physical and a
phenomenal aspect” (Chalmers, 1996, p.
286). On this theory then, information
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actually is—has the property of being—
conscious.
One immediate problem with this idea
is that it involves a radical redefinition of
the word information, slipped in by the
back door in the sense that Chalmers never
acknowledges that everyone else’s defini-
tions are specifically at odds with his.
There are several technical defini-
tions of information, which differ slightly
depending on the field of enquiry. In infor-
mation philosophy, Floridi (2005) says
“ ‘information’ is often used to refer
to non-mental, user-independent, declar-
ative semantic contents, embedded in
physical implementations like databases,
encyclopedias, web sites, television pro-
grammes and so on. . . the Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, for example,
defines information thus: ‘an objective
(mind independent) entity. . . Information
can be encoded and transmitted, but the
information would exist independently of
its encoding or transmission’.” Floridi then
lists a number of sources that define infor-
mation as data + meaning, before arguing
that truth is also a necessary ingredient
(because if information is not truthful,
it should more properly be called misin-
formation or pseudo-information). Other
technical definitions exclude even mean-
ing. Classical or Shannon information the-
ory was born out of a need to address
the technical problems experienced by
Shannon’s employer Bell Labs in extract-
ing signals from noise in telephone and
telegraph lines, so Shannon (1948) equates
information simply with the observation
that a particular one out of a defined set
of possible messages has been sent from
one entity to another—the meaning of the
message is explicitly stated to be irrelevant.
Cybernetics (Sayre, 1976) later generalizes
Shannon’s definition to equate informa-
tion with increased probability, or reduc-
tion in uncertainty.
The point is that all of these definitions
take information itself as an objective,
mind-independent entity. Thus, whatever
it is for which Chalmers (1996) and oth-
ers now claim a subjective or phenomenal
aspect, it cannot be what everyone else
calls “information.”
A second objection to the Chalmers
proposal, which this time he does
acknowledge, is that thermostats (for
example) clearly carry information, but
are not widely regarded as having any
degree of consciousness. Chalmers offers a
choice of two options to deal with this:
(1) Perhaps only some kinds of “physi-
cally realized information spaces” are
conscious.
(2) Perhaps thermostats are conscious.
Chalmers himself chooses option (2).
He suggests, on no particular grounds,
that the level of organization at which
consciousness “winks out” might be
lower than a thermostat but higher than
a rock.
TONONI’S PROCESS THEORY
Another widely cited process theorist is
Giulio Tononi. Tononi prefers Chalmers’
option (1)—his integrated information
theory (IIT) proposes that only integrated
information is conscious. Actually the ini-
tial formulation of IIT (Tononi, 2004)
sidesteps the question altogether, saying
only: “The theory presented here claims
that consciousness has to do with the
capacity to integrate information” and
“To recapitulate, the theory claims that
consciousness corresponds to the capac-
ity to integrate information.” [emphases
added]. But this unobjectionable formula-
tion soon morphs into the firm statement
“consciousness is integrated information”
(Tononi, 2008, 2012). Integrated informa-
tion is defined in terms of various brain
processes known to be associated with
consciousness—one might almost infer
that it was tempting simply to equate inte-
grated information with conscious infor-
mation, except that this would not have
been terribly informative in the cyber-
netic sense of the word—and both Tononi
and Seth et al. (2011) invest consider-
able effort in suggesting how integrated
information might be quantified. Later
Koch (2014) adds Chalmers’ option (2)
to the IIT mix and invokes panpsychism,
admitting that inasmuch as integrated
information is everywhere, consciousness
must also be everywhere. Despite all the
work that has by now been put into
mathematical quantification of integrated
information, no specific estimate of the
quantity necessary for the appearance
of consciousness is offered, but Koch
speculates that the internet might be
conscious.
MCFADDEN’S PROCESS THEORY
McFadden (2013) in his CEMI (con-
scious electromagnetic information) the-
ory, sticks with Chalmers’ option (1),
proposing that consciousness is associ-
ated only with electromagnetically encoded
information. McFadden draws a distinc-
tion between extrinsic information (which
he says is symbolic and arbitrary and
exemplified by Shannon information) and
intrinsic information, (which “preserves
structural aspects of the represented object
and thereby maintains some gestalt prop-
erties of the represented object”). He
argues that “to avoid the necessity of a
decoding homunculus, conscious mean-
ing must be encoded intrinsically—as
gestalt information—in the brain.” The
precise relationship of this encoded gestalt
information to consciousness is never
spelled out, but it is probably not iden-
tity. McFadden does ascribe properties to
consciousness and as he rightly says in his
discussion of Chalmers’ dual aspect the-
ory, “it is not at all clear whether it is
legitimate to ascribe properties to abstrac-
tions, such as the informational content of
matter.”
WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
There are several problems with all of
this. First, since information is explicitly
defined by everyone except process theo-
rists as an objective entity, it is not clear
how process theorists can reasonably claim
either that information in general, or that
any subset or variety of information in
particular, is subjective. No entity can log-
ically be both mind-independent and the
very essence of mind. Therefore, when
process theorists use the word “informa-
tion” they must be talking about some-
thing quite different from what everyone
else means by that word. Exactly what they
are talking about needs clarification.
Second, since information is specif-
ically defined by everybody (including
Chalmers) as an abstract entity, any par-
ticular physical realization of informa-
tion does not count as information at
all. A “physical realization of an infor-
mation space” like James Joyce’s copy of
Dante’s Inferno may carry information,
but it is not itself information—it’s just an
arrangement of paper and ink. A “phys-
ical realization of an information space”
like Joe Bloggs’ brain when he looks at
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an octopus may encode information, but
it is not itself information—it’s just an
arrangement of neurons, glia and ions.
Of course, it is certainly possible to claim
that particular arrangements of neurons,
glia and ions are conscious—indeed some
remarkably eminent people have done so.
But that claim no longer represents a
dualist/process theory. It now represents
a physicalist/vehicle theory. Since at least
Chalmers specifically identifies his theory
as dualist, it is far from clear how he (or
others) can claim even information status,
nevermind consciousness, for any particu-
lar kind of “physically realized information
space.”
Third, it is a problem at least for sci-
entists that process theories are untestable.
The hypothesis that a particular brain pro-
cess correlates with consciousness can cer-
tainly be tested empirically. But the only
potentially testable prediction of theories
that claim identity between consciousness
and a particular kind of information or
information processing is that this kind
of information or information process-
ing will be conscious no matter how it
is physically instantiated. This is a fea-
ture of process theories that makes them
very attractive to those who would like
to build a conscious artifact out of hard-
ware. The unspoken prediction is that all
one has to do to create artificial con-
sciousness is emulate the computations
done by the brain in some manner—any
physical instantiation will do. But sup-
pose it were possible to build a piece of
hardware that adequately reproduced the
brain computations underlying a partic-
ular sensory experience. How could we
know whether the result was conscious?
Consciousness is such a private phe-
nomenon that nobody can be 100% sure
even that their human neighbors are con-
scious at any given moment. We know
we are conscious. Other humans look and
act more or less like us, so when they
tell us they have a particular conscious
experience, we give them the benefit of
the doubt. But what about a bit of hard-
ware? Even a novice software writer could
produce a piece of code that typed “I
feel hot” whenever a thermostat registered
a high temperature, but not many peo-
ple would believe the appearance of this
message meant the thermostat was expe-
riencing hotness. Hence, neither the idea
that information or information process-
ing is conscious, nor its logical extension
panpsychism (the idea that everything is
conscious), is in any obvious way testable.
Of course, that doesn’t necessarilymean
these ideas are untrue. It just means
they are unscientific. It may be fine for
philosophers to play with the idea that
thermostats and computer networks are
conscious, but scientists are usually con-
strained to dealing in testable hypotheses.
REFERENCES
Atkinson, A. P., Thomas, M. S. C., and Cleeremans,
A. (2000). Consciousness: mapping the theoreti-
cal landscape. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 372–382 doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01533-3
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of
consciousness. Behav. Brain Sci. 18, 227–287. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X00038188
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: in Search
of a Fundamental Theory. New York; Oxford: OUP.
Floridi, L. (2005). Is semantic information meaning-
ful data? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 70, 351–370. doi:
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00531.x
Koch, C. (2014). Ubiquitous minds. Sci. Am. Mind
25, 26–29. doi: 10.1038/scientificamericanmind
0114-26
McFadden, J. J. (2013). The CEMI field theory:
gestalt information and the meaning of meaning.
J. Consciousness Stud. 20, 152–182.
Sayre, K. M. (1976). Cybernetics and the Philosophy of
Mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Seth, A. K., Barrett, A. B., and Barnett, L. (2011).
Causal density and integrated information as mea-
sures of conscious level. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 369,
3748–3767. doi: 10.1098/rsta.2011.0079
Shannon, C. E. (1948). A mathematical the-
ory of communication. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 27,
379–423, 623–656. doi: 10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.
tb01338.x
Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration the-
ory of consciousness. BMC Neurosci. 5:42. doi:
10.1186/1471-2202-5-42
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated infor-
mation: a provisional manifesto. Biol. Bull. 215,
216–242. doi: 10.2307/25470707
Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated information the-
ory of consciousness: an updated account.
Arch. Ital. Biol. 150, 290–326. doi: 10.4449/aib.
v149i5.1388
Velmans, M. (1991). Is human information process-
ing conscious? Behav. Brain Sci. 14, 651–669. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X00071776
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 02 October 2014; accepted: 09 November
2014; published online: 25 November 2014.
Citation: Pockett S (2014) Problems with theories that
equate consciousness with information or information
processing. Front. Syst. Neurosci. 8:225. doi: 10.3389/
fnsys.2014.00225
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Systems Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Pockett. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accor-
dance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribu-
tion or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 225 | 3
